Search Results - subject:"Limit ESS"

Heller, Yuval - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 1, pp. 203-241

We study a variant of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with uncertain horizon, in which each player chooses his foresight ability: that is, the timing in which he is informed about the realized length of the interaction. In addition, each player has an independent probability to observe the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599539

Three steps ahead

Heller, Yuval - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 1

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145592

Three steps ahead

Heller, Yuval - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 1, pp. 203-241

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673975

Stability and trembles in extensive-form games

Heller, Yuval - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

) notion of limit ESS. We demonstrate that a limit ESS does not imply neutral stability, and that it may be dynamically …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260615

Three steps ahead

Heller, Yuval - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 10 (2015) 1, pp. 203-241

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010528208

Stability and trembles in extensive-form games

Heller, Yuval - In: Games and Economic Behavior 84 (2014) C, pp. 132-136

A leading solution concept in the evolutionary study of extensive-form games is Selten (1983) notion of limit ESS. This … note demonstrates that a limit ESS does not imply neutral stability, and that it may be dynamically unstable (almost any …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049840

Stability and trembles in extensive-form games

Heller, Yuval - In: Games and economic behavior 84 (2014), pp. 132-136

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010481225