The paper studies the degree of homogeneity of innovative behavior in order to determine empirically an industry classi¯cation of Dutch manufacturing that can be used for policy purposes. We use a two-limit tobit model with sample selection, which explains the decisions by business enterprises...

This paper is concerned with the number of profiles at which a nondictatorial social choice function is manipulable. For three or more alternatives the lower bound is derived when the social choice function is nondictatorial and unanimous. In the case of three alternatives the lower bound is...

This paper focuses on the analysis of size distributions of innovations, which are known to be highly skewed. We use patent citations as one indicator of innovation significance, constructing two large datasets from the European and US Patent Offices at a high level of aggregation, and the...

We develop a model of an innovative industry to examine how information technology, by both enhancing matching efficiency and knowledge sharing, can have an ambiguous effect on the total amount of innovation. We consider a population of firms holding different knowledge expertise, and forming...

The paper studies the degree of homogeneity of innovative behavior in order to determine empirically an industry classi¯cation of Dutch manufacturing that can be used for policy purposes. We use a two-limit tobit model with sample selection, which explains the decisions by business enterprises...

In this paper we present a model for games with perfect information in which the players, upon observing an unexpected move, may revise their beliefs about the opponents'' preferences over outcomes. For a given profile P of preference relations over outcomes, we impose the following three...

In many real life passenger railway networks, the types of stations and lines characterisethe halting stations of the train lines. Common types are Regional, Interregional or Intercity.This paper considers the problem of altering the halts of lines by both upgrading and downgrading stations,...

A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating...

I consider n-person normal form games where the strategy set of every player is a non-empty compact convex subset of Euclidean space, and the payoff function of player i is continuous and concave in player i''s own strategies. No further restrictions (such as multilinearity of the payoff...

Gibbard''s (1973) and Satterthwaite''s (1975) result implies that anonymous surjective social choice functions on more than two alternatives are manipulable. Placing some mild constraints on the number of agents compared to the number of alternatives, we show what the minimal number of...