A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating...

In this paper, we consider a two-stage (sequential) game as introduced by Vickers (1985),Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987). This game models the situation where the owners of competing firms manipulate their managers'' incentive contracts for strategic reasons....

This paper is concerned with the minimal number of profiles at which a unanimous and anonymous social choice function is manipulable. The lower bound is derived when there are three alternatives to choose from. Examples of social choice functions attaining the lower bound are given. We...

In this paper we present a new auction, the bisection auction, that can be used for the sale of a single indivisible object. We discuss the issue concerning the information revelation requirement of this auction and the associated amount of data that needs to be transmitted. We show that in the...

In many real life passenger railway networks, the types of stations and lines characterisethe halting stations of the train lines. Common types are Regional, Interregional or Intercity.This paper considers the problem of altering the halts of lines by both upgrading and downgrading stations,...

In this paper we present a model for games with perfect information in which the players, upon observing an unexpected move, may revise their beliefs about the opponents'' preferences over outcomes. For a given profile P of preference relations over outcomes, we impose the following three...

Weintraub's study shows that mathematics does not provide a fixed point of reference for economics. He explains how the notions of rigor and consistency have changed within mathematics over the years, and how it has proved impossible to express mathematics itself as a complete formal system. As...

Neoclassical economists argue that competition promotes efficiency. They consider technology as given though. In the long run technological progress is an important determinant of the level of welfare and Schumpeter argued that monopoly rents help entrepreneurs to capture the gains of R&D and...

We consider networks evolving over time within an infinite-horizon dynamic setting. Transitions from one network to another are given by a stationary transition probability matrix. We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating the value of a network at any point in time among its...

In this paper we develop an epistemic model for dynamic games in which players may revise their beliefs about the opponents'' preferences (including the opponents'' utility functions) as the game proceeds. Within this framework, we propose a rationalizability concept that is based upon the...