A game form constitutionally implements a social choice correspondence if it implements it in Nash equilibrium and, moreover, the associated effectivity functions coincide. This paper presents necessary and sufficient conditions for a unanimous social choice correspondence to be constitutionally...

This note shows that the antilog of Shannon’s entropy is a suitableindex of product variety for three reasons. First, for symmetricproduct types it is equal to the number of product types. Second, disaggregationof the underlying product set always leads to an increasein measured product...

In this paper, the author of How Economics Became a Mathematical Science (Duke University Press, 2002) responds to four papers (from Paul Davidson, Sheila Dow, Donald Katzner,and J. Barkley Rosser Jr.) written for a symposium on his book. In addition to specific responses to points raised by the...

Neoclassical economists argue that competition promotes efficiency. They consider technology as given though. In the long run technological progress is an important determinant of the level of welfare and Schumpeter argued that monopoly rents help entrepreneurs to capture the gains of R&D and...

This note shows that the antilog of Shannon’s entropy is a suitableindex of product variety for three reasons. First, for symmetricproduct types it is equal to the number of product types. Second, disaggregationof the underlying product set always leads to an increasein measured product...

We consider networks evolving over time within an infinite-horizon dynamic setting. Transitions from one network to another are given by a stationary transition probability matrix. We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating the value of a network at any point in time among its...

In this paper we develop an epistemic model for dynamic games in which players may revise their beliefs about the opponents'' preferences (including the opponents'' utility functions) as the game proceeds. Within this framework, we propose a rationalizability concept that is based upon the...

A game form constitutionally implements a social choice correspondence if it implements it in Nash equilibrium and, moreover, the associated effectivity functions coincide. This paper presents necessary and sufficient conditions for a unanimous social choice correspondence to be constitutionally...

In this experimental study we analyse three collective and one individual punishmentrule in a public good setting. We show that under all punishment rules cooperationis stronger and more sustainable than reported from settings without punishment.Moreover, we present evidence and explanations for...