We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von...

In two-sided matching problems, we consider “natural” changes in preferences of agents in which only the rankings of current partners are enhanced. We introduce two desirable properties of matching rules under such rank-enhancements of partners. One property requires that an agent who...

Evaluationsansätze auf Basis von Matchingverfahren werden heute weitgehend als superiores Instrument zur Bewertung der Wirksamkeit der Förderung beruflicher Weiterbildung angesehen. Die vorliegende Arbeit gibt zu bedenken, dass solche Verfahren ungenaue Schätzergebnissen generieren, wenn eine...

We generalize a well-known Gale–Shapley algorithm [4] concerning optimal assignment of candidates to schools. In the classical Gale–Shapley model we consider a set of schools (colleges) S, a set of candidates K, candidates’ preferences in S and schools’ preferences in the set K...

This paper considers a resource allocation mechanism that utilizes a profit-maximizing auctioneer/matchmaker in the Kelso–Crawford (1982) (many-to-one) assignment problem. We consider general and simple (individualized price) message spaces for firmsʼ reports following Milgrom (2010). We show...