The legality of a horizontal merger under section 7 of the Clayton Act turns on a reckoning of its social costs and benefits. This paper reviews what economics has to say about that reckoning and explores the relationship between economic learning and merger law and policy

We tend to think of mergers and monopolization as separate and distinct branches of antitrust. Using Section 2 to attack mergers raises the question of whether merger enforcement has been ineffective. But there is another explanation. The legal and economic frameworks are most developed when it...

The Grand Chamber set aside the judgment of the General Court in CK Telecoms having found eight errors in law. This paper dissects the judgment of the Grand Chamber and illustrates and explains the differences between the two judgments as well as their significance. The Grand Chamber clarifies...

Previous iterations of the DOJ/FTC Merger Guidelines have articulated a clear, rigorous, and transparent methodology for balancing the pro-competitive benefits of mergers against their anticompetitive costs. By describing agency practice, guidelines facilitate compliance, ensure consistent and...

On July 18, 2023, the Agencies responsible for enforcing antitrust law relating to mergers—the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission—published draft Merger Guidelines (dMGs) for comment. This comment reflects cumulative experience from four decades as an enforcer, from...

Advocates of vigorous antitrust enforcement should not fear the rise of textualism. The Sherman Act, Clayton Act and FTC Act were all enacted as a result of the progressive movement. These laws were written in large part to protect the interests of consumers against possible exploitation by...