The second-generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid auction.The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation...

This paper studies whether collusion occurs in three-bidder three-object second-price hard-close auctions. The experimental results of two laboratory treatments are reported. The first one, the anonymity treatment, involves subject groups that can trace decisions to the bidder under conditions...

Whether rationality of economic behavior increases with expected payoffs and decreases with the cognitive cost it takes to formulate an optimal strategy remains an open question. We explore these issues with field data, using individual bids from sealed-bid auctions in which we sold nearly...

One of the main elements of the current reform of electricty trading in the UK is the change from a uniform price auction in the wholesale market to discriminatory pricing. We analyse this change under two polar market structures (perfectly competitive and monopolistic supply), with demand...

We examine an auction in which the seller determines the supply after observing the bids. We compare the uniform price and the discriminatory auction in a setting of supply uncertainty. Uncertainty is caused by the interplay of two factors: the seller's private information about marginal cost,...

This paper studies whether collusion occurs in three-bidder three-object second-price hard-close auctions. The experimental results of two laboratory treatments are reported. The first one, the anonymity treatment,involves subject groups which can trace decisions to the bidder under conditions...

In simultaneous ascending price auctions with heterogeneous goods Brusco and Lopomo (2002) derive collusive equilibria where bidders divide objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. Considering a simultaneous ascending price auction with a fixed deadline, i.e. the Hard Close...

We study collusion in the finitely repeated, hard-close auction experiment. Three subjects, identified by their bidder name, simultaneously compete in three auction markets. Due to the experimental design, subjects are enabled to the sharing of the benefits of cooperation by coordinating their...