We extend Milgrom and Weber's affiliated valuations model to the multi-unit case. We show that the discriminatory auction has a unique equilibrium, that corresponds to Milgrom and Weber's first-price equilibrium in the 2-bidder, constant marginal valuations case. This unique equilibrium...

We extend Milgrom and Weber's affiliated valuations model to the multi-unit case. We show that the discriminatory auction has a unique equilibrium, that corresponds to Milgrom and Weber's first-price equilibrium in the 2-bidder, constant marginal valuations case. This unique equilibrium...

Treasury debt and other divisible securities are traditionally sold in either a pay-your-bid (discriminatory) auction or a uniform-price auction. We compare these auction formats with a Vickrey auction and also with two ascending-bid auctions. The Vickrey auction and the alternative...

Auction theory has recently revealed that multi-unit uniform-price auctions, such as those used by the U.S. Treasury for debt sales, entail demand-reduction incentives that can cause inefficient allocations. Recent experimental results show that bidders do indeed strategically reduce their bids...

We consider two ascending auctions for multiple objects, namely, an English and a Japanese auction, and derive a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the Japanese auction by exploiting its strategic equivalence with the survival auction, which consists of a finite sequence of sealed-bid auctions....

This paper considers a uniform-price auction in which each of n symmetric bidders can place, say, M bids. Each bidder has privately known, decreasing marginal values from an arbitrary M -dimensional distribution. We provide a quantile-type description of the asymptotic price that appropriately...