Search Results - subject:"Multi–Unit Auctions"

Multi-Unit Auctions to Allocate Water Scarcity Simulating Bidding Behaviour with Agent Based Models

Hailu, Atakelty; Thoyer, Sophie - EconWPA - 2005

Multi-unit auctions are promising mechanisms for the reallocation of water. The main advantage of such auctions is to … avoid the lumpy bid issue. However, there is great uncertainty about the best auction formats when multi-unit auctions are …- unit auctions but they remain scarce and most experiments are restricted to two bidders and two units. Moreover, they …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124870

Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing

Ausubel, Lawrence; Cramton, Peter - In: Economic Theory 23 (2004) 3, pp. 493-505

We generalize the Vickrey auction to allow for reserve pricing in a multi-unit auction with interdependent values. In the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing, the seller determines the quantity to be made available as a function of the bidders' reports of private information, and then...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371037

Underpricing and Market Power in Uniform Price Auctions

Kremer, Ilan; Nyborg, Kjell G - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

In uniform auctions, buyers choose demand schedules as strategies and pay the same ‘market clearing’ price for units awarded. Despite the widespread use of these auctions, the extant theory shows that they are susceptible to arbitrarily large underpricing. We make a realistic modification to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067628

Order Flow and the Formation of Dealer Bids in Treasury Auctions

Hortacsu, Ali; Sareen, Samita - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2004

Using data on Government of Canada securities auctions, this paper shows that in countries where direct access to primary debt issuance is restricted to government securities dealers, "order-flow" information is potentially the key source of private information for these security dealers....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005027297

Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions

McAdams, David - Econometric Society - 2004

Existence of monotone pure strategy equilibrium is established in the discriminatory and uniform S + a-th price (a in [0, 1]) auctions of S identical objects when bidders are risk-neutral with independent signals. The model requires discrete price / quantity grids and allows for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342189

Menu Auctions with Demand Uncertainty.

Krishna, Kala; Tranæs, Torben - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2003

We apply a Bernheim-Whinston (1986) type mechanism to a situation where a single buyer with uncertain demand wishes to buy from a small number of suppliers. We let suppliers bid a payment contingent on own quantity supplied, and another payment contingent on the realization of total demand. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749742

COLLUSION OR SNIPING IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING AUCTIONS — A PRISONER'S DILEMMA

FÜLLBRUNN, SASCHA - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 13 (2011) 01, pp. 75-82

In simultaneous ascending price auctions with heterogeneous goods Brusco and Lopomo [2002] derive collusive equilibria, where bidders divide objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. Considering a simultaneous ascending price auction with a fixed deadline, i.e. the hard close...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009366445

Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions - An Experimental Investigation and some Theoretical Insights

Engelmann, Dirk; Grimm, Veronika - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2003

We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with at demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. Revenue...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357505

On some collusive and signaling equilibria in ascending auctions for multiple objects

LOVO, Stefano; ALBANO, Gian Luigi; GERMANO, Fabrizio - HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales) - 2002

We consider two ascending auctions for multiple objects: the SEAMO (simultaneous English auction for multiple objects) and the the JAMO (Japanese auction for multiple objects). We first derive a (competitive) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the JAMO by exploiting the strategic equivalence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005011519

Optimal Bidding Strategies in Non-Sealed Bid Online Auctions of Common Products with Quantity Uncertainty

Supatgiat, Chonawee; Birge, John R.; Zhang, Rachel Q. - EconWPA - 2002

We consider non-sealed bid online auctions of common products with quantity uncertainty. Both first-price (also known as pay-as-you-bid) and uniform-price auctions are considered. In these auctions, all bidders have the same valuation of the products but may have different demand quantities. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550969