We build a dynamic agency model in which the agent controls both current earnings via short-term investment and firm growth via long-term investment. Under the optimal contract, agency conflicts can induce short- and long-term investment levels beyond first best, leading to short- or...

A new approach to moral hazard is presented. Once local incentive compatibility is satisfied, the problem of verifying global incentive compatibility is shown to be isomorphic to the problem of comparing two classes of distribution functions. Thus, tools from choice under uncertainty can be...

A new approach to moral hazard is presented. Once local incentive compatibil- ity is satis?ed, the problem of verifying global incentive compatibility is shown to be isomorphic to the problem of comparing two classes of distribution functions. Thus, tools from choice under uncertainty can be...

Based on a unique time-use survey of academic researchers in Japan, this study finds that research time decreases over the life cycle. The decrease in total hours worked and the increase in time spent on administrative tasks explain the decrease in research time. We also show that the decrease...

Based on a unique time-use survey of academic researchers in Japan, this study finds that research time decreases over the life cycle. The decrease in total hours worked and the increase in time spent on administrative tasks explain the decrease in research time. We also show that the decrease...