Search Results - subject:"Multi Tasking"

Structural Empirical Evaluation of Job Search Monitoring

den Berg, Gerard J van; van der Klaauw, Bas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

We structurally estimate a novel job search model with endogenous job search effort, job quality dispersion, and effort monitoring, taking into account that monitoring effects may be mitigated by on-the-job search and search channel substitution. The data are from a randomized experiment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084149

Using profit information for production management: evidence from Japanese factories

Arai, Kohei; Kitada, Hirotsugu; Oura, Keisuke - In: Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change 9 (2013) 4, pp. 408-426

-financial performance measures with two characteristics of manufacturing systems: interdependence and multi-tasking. Findings – The results … indicate that interdependence has a significant and positive association with the importance of profit information, while multi-tasking …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014840644

Using profit information for production management : evidence from Japanese factories

Arai, Kohei; Kitada, Hirotsugu; Oura, Keisuke - In: Journal of accounting & organizational change 9 (2013) 4, pp. 408-426

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010207121

Essays on incentive contracts under moral hazard and non-verifiable performance

Schoettner, Anja - 2005

Diese Dissertation enthält vier Aufsätze zur Theorie der Anreizsetzung bei nicht-verifizierbaren Leistungsmaßen. Es werden positive Dominanzanalysen für Anreizmechanismen durchgeführt, die in realen wirtschaftlichen Situationen Anwendung finden. Der erste Aufsatz analysiert zwei...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009467167

Relational contracts and job design

Schöttner, Anja - 2005

This paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263609

Relational Contracts and Job Design

Schöttner, Anja - Sonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko, … - 2005

always beneflts from assigning an additional task to this agent. Keywords: job design, multi-tasking, relational contracts … flrst contributions to multi-tasking and job design are Holmstr˜om and Milgrom (1991) and Itoh (1991, 1992).7 They study … assigned to 8All vectors are column vectors. Superscript T denotes transpose. 9Similar multi-tasking approaches are widely …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005678043

Multi-tasking and inequity aversion in the linear–exponential–normal moral hazard model

Bartling, Björn - In: Economics Letters 116 (2012) 3, pp. 523-525

linear–exponential–normal moral hazard model with multi-tasking. We consider individual and team production tasks that differ …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041848

Human Capital Accumulation and the Transition from Specialisation to Multi-tasking

Raouf, BOUCEKKINE; Patricia, CRIFO - Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), … - 2003

This paper provides theoretical foundations to the contemporaneous increase in computer usage, human capital and multi-tasking …. Organizational change is then analysed in a dynamic perspective as the transition from specialization towards multi-tasking …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985012

Human capital accumulation and the transition from specialization to multi-tasking

BOUCEKKINE, Raouf; CRIFO, Patricia - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2003

This paper provides theoretical foundations to the contemporaneous increase in computer usage, human capital and multi-tasking … change is then analysed in a dynamic perspective as the transition from specialization towards multi-tasking emphasizing its …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043551

Contracts as Threats: on a Rationale For Rewarding A while Hoping For B

Iossa, Elisabetta; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

Contracts often reward inefficient tasks and are not enforced ex post. We provide a new explanation based on the relationship between explicit contracts and implicit agreements, distinguishing the ex-ante decision to sign a contract from the ex-post decision whether to apply it. We show that it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854495