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  • Search: subject:"Multiple—Object Auctions"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Multiple Object Auctions 8 Auctions 7 Collusion 4 Spectrum Auctions 4 Auction 2 Auction theory 2 Auktionstheorie 2 Complementarities 2 Electricity Auctions 2 circle 2 multiple object auctions 2 multiple-object auctions 2 revenue equivalence 2 Allgemeines Gleichgewicht 1 Auktion 1 Budget Constraints 1 Budget constraints 1 Complementarity 1 D44 [H] 1 E-commerce 1 Electronic Commerce 1 English Auction 1 Exposure problem 1 General equilibrium 1 Information costs 1 Informationskosten 1 Multiple object auctions 1 Multiple-object auctions 1 Multiple—Object Auctions 1 Nash Equilibrium 1 Nash equilibrium 1 Nash-Gleichgewicht 1 Resale 1 Simultaneous auctions 1 Synergy 1 Theorie 1 Theory 1 Threshold problem 1 Walrasian Equilibrium 1 asymmetric bidders 1
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Online availability
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Free 8 Undetermined 6
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 8 Article 7
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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research-article 2 Arbeitspapier 1 Article in journal 1 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 1 Graue Literatur 1 Non-commercial literature 1 Working Paper 1
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Language
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English 10 Undetermined 5
Author
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Cramton, Peter 7 Schwartz, Jesse 3 Brusco, Sandro 2 Lopomo, Giuseppe 2 Wilson, Robert 2 Zhang, Qinghua 2 Ausubel, Lawrence M. 1 Chao, Hung-po 1 Kannan, Karthik 1 Ma, Jinpeng 1 Overby, Eric 1 Pezanis-Christou, Paul 1 Schwartz, Jesse A 1 Zheng, Charles Z. 1
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Institution
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University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton 5 Economics Department, State University of New York-Stony Brook (SUNY) 1 School of Economics, University of Adelaide 1
Published in...
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Papers of Peter Cramton 5 Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy 1 Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy 1 Department of Economics Working Papers / Economics Department, State University of New York-Stony Brook (SUNY) 1 Economic Theory 1 Games and Economic Behavior 1 Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences 1 School of Economics Working Papers 1 The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 1 Topics in Theoretical Economics 1 Working papers / Rutgers University, Department of Economics 1
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Source
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RePEc 11 ECONIS (ZBW) 2 Other ZBW resources 2
Showing 1 - 10 of 15
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Asymmetric Multiple-Object First-Price Auctions
Pezanis-Christou, Paul - School of Economics, University of Adelaide - 2013
The paper reports on the effects of one-sided imperfect information on bidding behaviour in simultaneous and sequential first-price auctions of non-identical objects when bidders have multi-unit demands. The analysis provides the following four main results. First, when different objects are to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010819757
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How reduced search costs and the distribution of bidder participation affect auction prices
Overby, Eric; Kannan, Karthik - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 61 (2015) 6, pp. 1398-1420
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011293380
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Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Complementarities and Known Budget Constraints
Brusco, Sandro; Lopomo, Giuseppe - Economics Department, State University of New … - 2005
We study simultaneous ascending auctions of identical objects when bidders are financially constrained and their valuations exhibit complementarities. We assume the budget constraints are known but the values for individual objects are private information, and characterize noncollusive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008461791
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Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints
Brusco, Sandro; Lopomo, Giuseppe - In: Economic Theory 38 (2009) 1, pp. 105-124
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370666
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Review of the Proposed Reserve Markets in New England
Cramton, Peter; Chao, Hung-po; Wilson, Robert - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2005
ISO New England proposes reserve markets designed to improve the existing forward reserve market and improve pricing during real-time reserve shortages. We support all of the main elements of the proposal. For example, we agree that little is gained by allowing reserve availability bids in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988750
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Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions
Zheng, Charles Z. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 648-664
A model of English auctions is proposed to incorporate the possibility of jump bidding. When two objects are sold separately via such auctions, bidders signal their willingness to pay via jump bids, thereby forming rational expectations of the prices without relying on any central mediator....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010588270
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Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions
Cramton, Peter; Schwartz, Jesse - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2002
This paper describes the signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. The FCC's simultaneous ascending auctions allowed bidders to bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder was willing to raise the bid on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988795
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Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions
Cramton, Peter; Schwartz, Jesse - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2000
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to bid higher on any license. With full revelation of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988751
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The Optimality of Being Efficient
Cramton, Peter; Ausubel, Lawrence M. - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1998
In an optimal auction, a revenue-optimizing seller often awards goods inefficiently, either by placing them in the wrong hands or by withholding goods from the market. This conclusion rests on two assumptions: (1) the seller can prevent resale among bidders after the auction; and (2) the seller...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988776
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A Review of ISO New England's Proposed Market Rules
Cramton, Peter; Wilson, Robert - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1998
This report reviews the proposed rules for restructured wholesale electricity markets in New England. We review the market rules, both individually and collectively, and identify potential problems that might limit the efficiency of these markets. We examine alternatives and identify the key...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988790
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