The significance of population monotonicity and welfare bounds is well-recognized in the fair division literature. We characterize population monotonic and incentive compatible mechanisms which allocate the goods efficiently and respect a welfare lower bound chosen in the fair allocation problem...

The significance of population monotonicity and welfare bounds is well-recognized in the fair division literature. We characterize population monotonic and incentive compatible mechanisms which allocate the goods efficiently and respect a welfare lower bound chosen in the fair allocation problem...

We study the allocation of collectively owned indivisible goods when monetary transfers are possible. We restrict our attention to incentive compatible mechanisms which allocate the goods efficiently. Among these mechanisms, we characterize those that respect the identical-preferences...

In the problem of assigning indivisible goods and monetary transfers, we characterize welfare-egalitarian mechanisms (that are decision-efficient and incentive compatible) with an axiom of solidarity under preference changes and a fair ranking axiom of order preservation. This result is in line...

We characterize welfare-egalitarian mechanisms (that are decision-efficient and incentive compatible) with the two fundamental axioms of fairness: no-envy and egalitarian-equivalence. We consider cases where agents have equal rights over external world resources but are individually responsible...

We study the allocation of collectively owned indivisible goods when monetary transfers are possible. We restrict our attention to incentive compatible mechanisms which allocate the goods efficiently. Among these mechanisms, we characterize those that respect welfare lower bounds. The main...