An instance of the marriage problem is given by a graph G together with, for each vertex of G, a strict preference order over its neighbors. A matching M of G is popular in the marriage instance if M does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching where vertices are voters. Every...

Our input is a complete graph G on n vertices where each vertex has a strictranking of all other vertices in G. The goal is to construct a matching in G that is "globallystable" or popular. A matching M is popular if M does not lose a head-to-head election againstany matching M': here each...

An instance of the marriage problem is given by a graph G together with, for each vertex of G, a strict preference order over its neighbors. A matching M of G is popular in the marriage instance if M does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching where vertices are voters. Every...

Our input is a complete graph G on n vertices where each vertex has a strictranking of all other vertices in G. The goal is to construct a matching in G that is "globallystable" or popular. A matching M is popular if M does not lose a head-to-head election againstany matching M': here each...

Stable flows generalize the well-known concept of stable matchings to markets in which transactions may involve several agents, forwarding flow from one to another. An instance of the problem consists of a capacitated directed network in which vertices express their preferences over their...

Stable flows generalize the well-known concept of stable matchings to markets in which transactions may involve several agents, forwarding flow from one to another. An instance of the problem consists of a capacitated directed network in which vertices express their preferences over their...

Focusing on the testable implications on the equilibrium manifold, we show that the rationalizability problem is NP-complete. Subsequently, we present an integer programming (IP) approach to characterizing general equilibrium models. This approach avoids the use of the Tarski-Seidenberg...

Recently Cherchye et al. (2007a) provided a nonparametric characterization of a general collective model for household consumption which includes externalities and public consumption. This characterization involved different necessary and sufficient conditions. We identify a special case of the...

This paper discusses an aspect of computational complexity in social choice theory. We consider the problem of designing voting rules, which is formulated in terms of simple games. We prove that it is an NP-complete problem to decide whether a given simple game is stable, or not.