Search Results - subject:"Nash implementation"

Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction

Lombardi, Michele - In: Review of Economic Design 16 (2012) 4, pp. 297-309

Benoît and Ok (Games Econ Behav 64:51–67, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">2008</CitationRef>) show that in a society with at least three agents any weakly unanimous social choice correspondence (SCC) is Maskin’s monotonic if and only if it is Nash-implementable via a simple stochastic mechanism (Benoît-Ok’s Theorem). This paper...</citationref>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010994720

Issues of robustness in economics of information

Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011817056

Divide-and-Permute

Thomson, William - University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research … - 2004

-1177. Dutta, B., A. Sen, and R. Vohra, \Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments", Economic …" Econometrica 56 (1988), 661-692. Repullo, R., \A simple proof of Maskin’s theorem on Nash implementation," Social Choice and … Rochester disserta- tion, 1991a. ||, \On the necessary and su–cient conditions for Nash implementation", Social Choice and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005808208

Nash Implementable Liability Rules for Judgement-Proof Injurers

González, Patrick - Département d'Économique, Université Laval - 2004

everybody else. Keywords: negligence rule, limited liability, multiple injurers, Nash implementation. JEL: D78, H23, K13. ∗pgon … strategy is not possible with judgement-proof players. This justify the focus on Nash implementation. In section 4, I recast … spending that can be achieved under Nash implementation. With this characterization at hand, I identify the rule that provides …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005796023

Nash Implementable Liability Rules for Judgement-Proof Injurers

González, Patrick - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2004

I provide a complete characterization of Nash implementable allocations of spending in prevention by judgement-proof injurers. This characterization is used to identify the optimal rule that allows for the maximum total spending in prevention. The optimal rule amounts to apply the negligence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005273013

Implementation via mechanisms with transfers

Yi, Jianxin - In: Mathematical Social Sciences 61 (2011) 1, pp. 65-70

condition for Nash implementation by transfers. Furthermore, we construct a simplified mechanism, which Nash-implements the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008869047

Fiscal Policy and the Implementation of the Walsh Contract for Central Bankers

Huang, Haizhou; Padilla, A. Jorge - In: Annals of Economics and Finance 3 (2002) 1, pp. 27-42

We develop a simple macroeconomic model where the time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy is due to tax distortions. If fiscal policy is exogenously fixed at its optimal level, a Walsh contract (Walsh, 1995) offered to an independent central bank implements the optimal monetary policy....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009147392

A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions

Özkal-Sanver, İpek; Sanver, M. - In: Theory and Decision 69 (2010) 3, pp. 439-452

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596827

Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples

Haake, Claus-Jochen; Klaus, Bettina - In: Theory and Decision 69 (2010) 4, pp. 537-554

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008673731

A Unified Implementation Theory

Saglam, Ismail - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2001

This paper unifies the theories of Nash implementation and Bayesian implementation in a single framework. Environments …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005790114