We consider a repeated electoral competition game between two parties, each representing a constituent with a given income level. Parties are unable to commit to any policy before the election; they choose a non-linear income tax schedule once elected. In each period, citizens cast a vote either...

Within a costly state verification setting, we derive the optimal financial contract between an entrepreneur, a (potentially financing) supervisor and a pure investor when there is non-verifiable and non-contractible monitoring and limited liability. We show that diversion of cash flows to the...

I analyze how lack of commitment affects the maturity structure of sovereign debt. Ex post, the government trades off the gains from default induced redistribution against the cost of defaulting. Ex ante, the government issues debt of various maturities to raise an exogenous revenue requirement....

Within a costly state verification setting, we derive the optimal financial contract between an entrepreneur, a (potentially financing) supervisor and a pure investor when there is non-verifiable and non-contractible monitoring and limited liability. We show that diversion of cash flows to the...

The paper compares the optimal financial contracts of a firm which has private information over its expost revenues when the finance can be provided by either a single or two groups of investors. When they are the only investors we use a financial contract with non-contractible monitoring, in...

This paper considers the joint investment and labour contracts (employment and wage compensation) for a firm which has private information over its expost revenues. There is costly state observation for investors in the firm; workers can free ride on any investors state observation. The...