The problem of the existence of Berge equilibria in the sense of Zhukovskii in normal-form finite games in pure and in mixed strategies is studied. The example of a three-player game that has Berge equilibrium neither in pure, nor in mixed strategies is given.

Deviations from equilibrium predictions in one-shot games are common in experiments, and various models have been proposed to capture the behavior of boundedlyrational players in games. While the Quantal Response Equilibrium model allows players to better respond to correct beliefs, in the model...

This paper develops a framework for estimating Quantal Response Equilibrium models from experimental data using Bayesian techniques. Bayesian techniques offer some advantages over the more commonly-used maximum likelihood approach: (i) the accuracy of the posterior simulation is limited by...

Game-theoretic models of learning are hard to study even in the laboratory setting due to econometric and practical concerns (like the limited length of an experimental session).In particular, as the simulations by (Salmon, 2001) show, in a cross-model (or "blind'') testing of several models,...

This note investigates a set of dynamic versions of the level-k (LK) and cognitive hierarchy (CH) models in repeated normal-form games. Conventional LK and CH models assume a reasoning process that does not allow learning. This can be a restrictive assumption: When facing a repeated game,...