Strategic investment is studied in a model where oligopolists take decisions sequentially. First period investment determines second period wealth and output, and this is anticipated correctly by Cournot oligopolists. In our model with linear technology firms invest less as competition...

This paper explores how costly price adjustment and strategic interaction may cause a leader-follower configuration to arise. While most imperfect models predict that price-setters will synchronize their moves, we show that leadership generates stable staggering.

This paper analyzes the strategic role of the temporal dimension of loan commitments in a model of competitive banks with imperfect competition in the borrower's industry.

In a vertical differentiation model, we investigate whether the property of finiteness holds when the average cost function depends on the quantity. We prove that this property holds when the cost function has increasing returns. In the case of cost functions with decreasing returns, we prove...

We consider a market in which a public firm completes against private ones, and ask what happens when the public firms is privatized. In the short run, privatization is harmful because prices rise: the disciplinary role of the public firm is lost. In the long run, privatization, leads to further...

A two-stage game is used in this paper to model a long-run market with spatially separated producers and with multi-period demands: first, firmas simultaneously and independently invest their capacities; second, after capacities are set up in the first stage and made public, firms engage in a...

An oligopoly with spatially dispersed producers and consumers and with multi-period demands is modeled in this paper.

In a world where firms are oligopolists, is it possible to create a customs union that raises the welfare of member countries without hurting non-members countries? We give sufficient conditions for an affirmative answer.

This note illustrates the fact that the number of active firms in free entry equilibrium may be largely indeterminate and different levels of positive profits may in many cases be sustained. This is shown to be true, in spite of market contestability, either under Cournot competition or under...

We consider a simple general equilibrium model with imperfect competition on the labor market. We show that on this market a rise in the number of trade unions may reduce the employment level. This result depends on the properties of the nominal wage-elasticity of the labor demand. It is...