We examine the effect of bilateral trade in a concentrated industry under Cournot competition, when firms are regulated by national agencies who care about national social welfare. We allow for differences in costs and market sizes, and for asymmetric information between regulatory agencies and...

Two rival firms must decide when to invest in R&D and whether the new products should be compatible. I show that network externalities may induce the firms to advance their introduction of new incompatible technologies.

A model of semicollusion, where firms collude on prices and compete on capacities, is tailor-made to the characteristics of the Norwegian cement market and tested empirically on this particular market for the period 1927-1982. The results indicate that the rapid increase in capacity and thereby...

Two TV channels compete on programming with respect to both time schedule (continuous choice) and programme progile (discrete choice), with a directional constraint concerning time schedule (viewers cannot watch TV before they get home). We show how the relative importance of programme progile...

This paper examines how firms interact with their rivals. The main novelty of our approach is that we let conjectural variations depend on the actual ability of other firms to react, which we measure by both the physical capacity and financial status of firms. Our main findings are threefold....