Search Results - subject:"OPTIMAL AUCTION"

Virtue of simplicity in asymmetric auctions

Banerjee, Shraman; Bhattacharjee, Swagata - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014227036

Optimal auction design with deferred inspection and reward

Alaei, Saeed; Belloni, Alexandre; Makhdoumi, Ali; … - In: Operations research 72 (2024) 6, pp. 2413-2429

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015371431

Ex-post implementation with interdependent values

Goyal, Saurav; Narayanan, Aroon - In: Games and economic behavior 142 (2023), pp. 440-453

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014470349

Information design in optimal auctions

Chen, Yi-chun; Yang, Xiangqian - In: Journal of economic theory 212 (2023), pp. 1-49

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014471802

Countering the winner's curse: Optimal auction design in a common value model

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1399-1434

We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of biddersâ€™ independent signals. If the object is optimally sold with probability one, then the optimal mechanism is simply a posted price, with the highest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189042

Countering the winner's curse : optimal auction design in a common value model

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1399-1434

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415457

Optimal equity auction with interdependent valuations

Wang, Dazhong; Xu, Xinyi - In: Journal of mathematical economics 100 (2022), pp. 1-17

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013367179

Countering the winner's curse : optimal auction design in a common value model

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - 2018

We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of bidders' independent signals. The optimal mechanism exhibits either neutral selection, wherein the object is randomly allocated at a price that all bidders are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011948704

Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings

Loyola, Gino - In: Review of economic design 25 (2021) 1/2, pp. 1-32

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012586224

Effets de réputation dans les enchères : l'inégalité des perdants

Bos, Olivier; Truyts, Tom - In: Revue économique : revue bimestrielle 72 (2021) 3, pp. 443-458

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012601727