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  • Search: subject:"One-to many bargaining"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Bargaining theory 2 Game theory 2 Negotiations 2 Nucleolus 2 Pairwise bargaining 2 Spieltheorie 2 Verhandlungen 2 Verhandlungstheorie 2 Benchmarking 1 Collective bargaining 1 Collective bargaining theory 1 Experiment 1 Gerechtigkeit 1 Justice 1 One-to many bargaining 1 One-to-many bargaining 1 Tarifverhandlungen 1 Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes 1 experiments 1 fairness 1 one-to-many bargaining with complementarity 1 social comparison;normative fairness benchmarks 1 transparency 1
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CC license 1 Free 1 Undetermined 1
Type of publication
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Article 3
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Article in journal 2 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 2
Language
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English 2 Undetermined 1
Author
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Montez, João 2 Mak, Vincent 1 Zwick, Rami 1
Published in...
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Games 1 Journal of Economic Theory 1 Journal of economic theory 1
Source
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ECONIS (ZBW) 2 RePEc 1
Showing 1 - 3 of 3
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Fairness and transparency in one-to-many bargaining with complementarity : an experimental study
Mak, Vincent; Zwick, Rami - In: Games 15 (2024) 4, pp. 1-29
We report an experiment designed to study bargaining behavior between one buyer and multiple sellers with complementarity and how it is influenced by fairness concern and information transparency. We base our setup on a structured alternating-offer bargaining model in which a buyer procures...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015073214
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One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable
Montez, João - In: Journal of economic theory 152 (2014), pp. 249-265
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010390322
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Cover Image
One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable
Montez, João - In: Journal of Economic Theory 152 (2014) C, pp. 249-265
We study a model where a central player (the principal) bargains bilaterally with each of several players (the agents) to create and share the surplus of a coalitional game. It is known that, if the payments that were previously agreed (with each of the remaining agents) are renegotiated in case...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785017
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