We analyze the dynamic interaction between civil society organizations and Government in a representative developing economy. Government favors corruption and so fails to build efficient institutions. On its side, civil society exerts pressure on Government to constrain it to halt corruption. We...

We solve an N 2 N player general-sum differential game. The optimization problem considered here is based on the Uzawa Lucas model of endogenous growth. Agents have logarithmic preferences and own two capital stocks. Since the number of players is an arbitrary fixed number N 2 N, the model?s...

We solve an N 2 N player general-sum differential game. The optimization problem considered here is based on the Uzawa Lucas model of endogenous growth. Agents have logarithmic preferences and own two capital stocks. Since the number of players is an arbitrary fixed number N 2 N, the model?s...

In this paper we solve an N N N players differential game with logarithmic objective functions. The optimization problem considered here is based on the Uzawa Lucas model of endogenous growth. Agents have logarithmic preferences and own two capital stocks. Since the number of players is an...