We study the small sample properties of conditional quantile estimators such as classical and IV quantile regression. First, we propose a higher-order analytical framework for comparing competing estimators in small samples and assessing the accuracy of common inference procedures. Our framework...

We study the small sample properties of conditional quantile estimators such as classical and IV quantile regression. First, we propose a higher-order analytical framework for comparing competing estimators in small samples and assessing the accuracy of common inference procedures. Our framework...

Using a laboratory experiment, we examine whether voluntary monetary sanctions induce subjects to coordinate more efficiently in a repeated minimum effort coordination game. While most groups first experience inefficient coordination in a baseline treatment, the efficiency increases...

This paper studies how external incentives can help agents to coordinate in summary-statistic games. Agents follow a myopic best-reply rule and face a trade-off between efficiency and strategic uncertainty. A principal can help agents to coordinate on the Pareto optimal equilibrium by monitoring...

This paper studies how external incentives can help agents to coordinate in summary-statistic games. Agents follow a myopic best-reply rule and face a trade-off between efficiency and strategic uncertainty. A principal can help agents to coordinate on the Pareto optimal equilibrium by monitoring...

This paper studies how external incentives can help agents to coordinate in summary-statistic games. Agents follow a myopic best-reply rule and face a trade-off between efficiency and strategic uncertainty. A principal can help agents to coordinate on the Pareto optimal equilibrium by monitoring...