Using a laboratory experiment, we examine whether voluntary monetary sanctions induce subjects to coordinate more efficiently in a repeated minimum effort coordination game. While most groups first experience inefficient coordination in a baseline treatment, the efficiency increases...

This paper studies how external incentives can help agents to coordinate in summary-statistic games. Agents follow a myopic best-reply rule and face a trade-off between efficiency and strategic uncertainty. A principal can help agents to coordinate on the Pareto optimal equilibrium by monitoring...

This paper studies how external incentives can help agents to coordinate in summary-statistic games. Agents follow a myopic best-reply rule and face a trade-off between efficiency and strategic uncertainty. A principal can help agents to coordinate on the Pareto optimal equilibrium by monitoring...

This paper studies how external incentives can help agents to coordinate in summary-statistic games. Agents follow a myopic best-reply rule and face a trade-off between efficiency and strategic uncertainty. A principal can help agents to coordinate on the Pareto optimal equilibrium by monitoring...

Using a laboratory experiment, we examine whether informal monetary sanctions can lead to better coordination in a repeated minimum effort coordination game. While most groups first experience inefficient coordination, the efficiency increases substantially after introducing an ex post...

Using a laboratory experiment, we examine whether informal monetary sanctions can lead to better coordination in a repeated minimum effort coordination game. While most groups first experience inefficient coordination, the efficiency increases substantially after introducing an ex post...