This paper examines both the desirability and feasibility of technology transfers in a setting where institutions governing the security of output or income are imperfect. Based on a guns-versus-butter model involving two countries (a technology leader and a technology laggard), our analysis...

This paper examines both the desirability and feasibility of technology transfers in a setting where institutions governing the security of output or income are imperfect. Based on a guns-versus-butter model involving two countries (a technology leader and a technology laggard), our analysis...

On the basis of a single-period, guns-versus-butter, complete-information model in which two agents dispute control over an insecure portion of their combined output, we study the choice between a peace agreement that maintains the status quo without arming (or unarmed peace) and open conflict...

On the basis of a single-period, guns-versus-butter, complete-information model in which two agents dispute control over an insecure portion of their combined output, we study the choice between a peace agreement that maintains the status quo without arming (or unarmed peace) and open conflict...