EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • A-Z
  • Beta
  • About EconBiz
  • News
  • Thesaurus (STW)
  • Academic Skills
  • Help
  •  My account 
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • Login
EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
Publications Events
Search options
Advanced Search history
My EconBiz
Favorites Loans Reservations Fines
    You are here:
  • Home
  • Search: subject:"Polynomial algorithm"
Narrow search

Narrow search

Year of publication
Subject
All
polynomial algorithm 8 NP-completeness 6 popular matching 6 Algorithm 4 Algorithmus 4 stable matching 4 Matching 3 NP-complete 2 Theorie 2 Theory 2 multicommodity flows 2 restricted edges 2 stable flows 2 ties 2 Graph theory 1 Graphentheorie 1 Mathematical programming 1 Mathematische Optimierung 1 Präferenztheorie 1 Search theory 1 Social network 1 Soziales Netzwerk 1 Suchtheorie 1 Theory of preferences 1
more ... less ...
Online availability
All
Free 8
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper 8
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 8 Arbeitspapier 4 Graue Literatur 4 Non-commercial literature 4
Language
All
English 8
Author
All
Cseh, Ágnes 8 Kavitha, Telikepalli 6 Faenza, Yuri 2 Matuschke, Jannik 2 Powers, Vladlena 2 Huang, Chien-Chung 1 Huang, Chien-chung 1
more ... less ...
Published in...
All
CERS-IE Working Papers 2 IEHAS Discussion Papers 2 KRTK-KTI working papers : KRTK-KTI WP 2 Mu̐helytanulmányok / Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, Közgazdaságtudományi Intézet 2
Source
All
ECONIS (ZBW) 4 EconStor 4
Showing 1 - 8 of 8
Cover Image
Understanding popular matchings via stable matchings
Cseh, Ágnes; Faenza, Yuri; Kavitha, Telikepalli; … - 2020
An instance of the marriage problem is given by a graph G together with, for each vertex of G, a strict preference order over its neighbors. A matching M of G is popular in the marriage instance if M does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching where vertices are voters. Every...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290306
Saved in:
Cover Image
Popular matchings in complete graphs
Cseh, Ágnes; Kavitha, Telikepalli - 2020
Our input is a complete graph G on n vertices where each vertex has a strictranking of all other vertices in G. The goal is to construct a matching in G that is "globallystable" or popular. A matching M is popular if M does not lose a head-to-head election againstany matching M': here each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290307
Saved in:
Cover Image
Understanding popular matchings via stable matchings
Cseh, Ágnes; Faenza, Yuri; Kavitha, Telikepalli; … - 2020
An instance of the marriage problem is given by a graph G together with, for each vertex of G, a strict preference order over its neighbors. A matching M of G is popular in the marriage instance if M does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching where vertices are voters. Every...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012211535
Saved in:
Cover Image
Popular matchings in complete graphs
Cseh, Ágnes; Kavitha, Telikepalli - 2020
Our input is a complete graph G on n vertices where each vertex has a strictranking of all other vertices in G. The goal is to construct a matching in G that is "globallystable" or popular. A matching M is popular if M does not lose a head-to-head election againstany matching M': here each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012211577
Saved in:
Cover Image
New and simple algorithms for stable flow problems
Cseh, Ágnes; Matuschke, Jannik - 2018
Stable flows generalize the well-known concept of stable matchings to markets in which transactions may involve several agents, forwarding flow from one to another. An instance of the problem consists of a capacitated directed network in which vertices express their preferences over their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290264
Saved in:
Cover Image
New and simple algorithms for stable flow problems
Cseh, Ágnes; Matuschke, Jannik - 2018
Stable flows generalize the well-known concept of stable matchings to markets in which transactions may involve several agents, forwarding flow from one to another. An instance of the problem consists of a capacitated directed network in which vertices express their preferences over their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012011575
Saved in:
Cover Image
Popular matchings with two-sided preferences and one-sided ties
Cseh, Ágnes; Huang, Chien-Chung; Kavitha, Telikepalli - 2017
We are given a bipartite graph G = (A B;E) where each vertex has a preference list ranking its neighbors: in particular, every a A ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference, whereas the preference list of any b B may contain ties. A matching M is popular if there is no matching M' such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011944920
Saved in:
Cover Image
Popular matchings with two-sided preferences and one-sided ties
Cseh, Ágnes; Huang, Chien-chung; Kavitha, Telikepalli - 2017
We are given a bipartite graph G = (A B;E) where each vertex has a preference list ranking its neighbors: in particular, every a A ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference, whereas the preference list of any b B may contain ties. A matching M is popular if there is no matching M' such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011757166
Saved in:
A service of the
zbw
  • Sitemap
  • Plain language
  • Accessibility
  • Contact us
  • Imprint
  • Privacy

Loading...