Search Results - subject:"Power Indices"

Voting Power Derives from the Poll Distribution. Shedding Light on Contentious Issues of Weighted Votes and the Constitutional Treaty

Paterson, Iain - Department of Economics and Finance Research and … - 2006

Straffin (1977) focusing on the probability distribution of voting poll outcomes. We present a unifying model of power indices …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005764176

Voting power derives from the poll distribution: Shedding light on contentious issues of weighted votes and the constitutional treaty

Paterson, Iain - 2006

Straffin (1977) focusing on the probability distribution of voting poll outcomes. We present a unifying model of power indices …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293717

On the evaluation of power in Parliaments and government formation

Andjiga, Nicolas G; Badirou, Daoud; Mbih, Boniface - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Management (CREM) - 2006

This paper is devoted to the study of power in Parliaments. We explain how the power of coalitions can be computed after political elections, and as a di¤erence with some previous papers, this analysis is used to give a prediction of what government can emerge from these elections.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005272608

COMPARING POWER INDICES

BERTINI, CESARINO; FREIXAS, JOSEP; GAMBARELLI, GIANFRANCO; … - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 15 (2013) 02, pp. 1340004-1

This paper aims to give a global vision concerning the state of the art of studies on 13 power indices and to establish …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010671633

CURRENT RESEARCH

OWEN, GUILLERMO - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 15 (2013) 02, pp. 1340010-1

The paper presents some issues currently under studying in the field of Cooperative Games. The related open problems are also mentioned.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010671634

SOME OPEN PROBLEMS IN SIMPLE GAMES

BERTINI, CESARINO; FREIXAS, JOSEP; GAMBARELLI, GIANFRANCO; … - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 15 (2013) 02, pp. 1340005-1

; in particular, weighted games and power indices. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010671636

POWER SHARING IN POLITICS

HOLLER, MANFRED J.; NURMI, HANNU - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 15 (2013) 03, pp. 1340013-1

After a brief description of a representative selection of power indices and a discussion of the notion of power in … can be highly relevant when we link power and power measures to causality. The concluding section discusses whether power … indices are measures that represent power and ratios of power, or whether they are indicators that point out properties of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010682646

ON ALLOCATING SEATS TO PARTIES AND DISTRICTS: APPORTIONMENTS

DEMANGE, GABRIELLE - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 15 (2013) 03, pp. 1340014-1

The paper presents the problem of choosing the representatives in an assembly when the whole electoral region is subdivided into several electoral districts. Because of the two dimensions, geographical (districts) and political (parties), the problem is called bi-apportionment. The main purpose...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010682648

On allocating seats to parties and districts : apportionments

Demange, Gabrielle - In: International game theory review 15 (2013) 3, pp. 1-14

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010126751

Power sharing in politics

Holler, Manfred J.; Nurmi, Hannu - In: International game theory review 15 (2013) 3, pp. 1-13

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010126754