Successful upstream collusion must satisfy both the incentive constraint (keeping cartel members in line) and the compensation constraint (preventing lawsuits from downstream firms). Our analysis shows that there is a non-monotonic and inverted U-shaped relationship between cartel incidence and...

We analyze Stackelberg leadership in a first-price auction. Leadership is induced by an information system, represented by a spy, that leaks one bidder's bid before others choose their bids. However, the leader may secretly revise his bid with some probability; therefore, the leaked bid is only...

In December 2020, Germany implemented a policy restricting online pharmacies from offering rebates on prescription drugs to members of the statutory health insurance. This policy change created a natural experiment, allowing us to analyze its impact on the pharmaceutical market using...

Das Kartellschadensersatzrecht hat in den vergangenen Jahren enorm an Aufmerksamkeit und Bedeutung gewonnen. Dabei hat sich der Diskurs jedoch bislang auf die Klagen unmittelbarer und mittelbarer Abnehmer fokussiert. Die vorliegende Arbeit stellt die Frage, ob daneben auch Mitbewerbern von...

We analyze the effects of better algorithmic demand forecasting on collusive profits. We show that the comparative statics crucially depend on the whether actions are observable. Thus, the optimal antitrust policy needs to take into account the institutional settings of the industry in question....

Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms,...