We examine how executive compensation can be designed to motivate product market collusion. We look at the 2013 decision to close several regional offices of the Department of Justice, which lowered antitrust enforcement for firms located near these closed offices. We argue that this made...

Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms,...

The assumption that firms maximize profit has been widely used in Economics to explain firms' behaviors and market outcomes. But the profit maximization assumption may lead to incorrect predictions when firms engage in strategic delegation between owners and managers who might have different...

Notwithstanding vigorous regulatory action against cartels in Australia and abroad, and the proliferation of antitrust class actions in North America, cartel class actions in Australia have been rare. The cartel class actions brought in Australia to date have faced significant challenges. These...

We study collusion between a public firm and a private firm, characterizing the outcome (market shares, profits, and consumer surplus) that results from Nash bargaining between the two firms relative to the non-cooperative outcome. We find that if the public firm’s preference for consumer...

Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals’ incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms,...