Using field and laboratory experiments, we demonstrate that the complexity of incentive schemes and worker bounded rationality can affect effort provision, by shrouding attributes of the incentives. In our setting, complexity leads workers to over-provide effort relative to a fully rational...

Agent-based modeling (ABM) is a popular tool for simulating complex systems. In addition to the key performance indicators ABM provides as main outputs of the modeling process, it also generates valuable information about the agents' roadmap, but the large volume of generated data is difficult...

With the evolution of generative AI systems, machine-made productions in the literary and artistic domain have reached a level of refinement that allows them to substitute human creations. Inevitably, the increasing sophistication of AI systems will disrupt the market for human literary and...

We present solutions to each of the major delegation problems that arise when elected officials delegate rulemaking authority to government agencies. These problems include principal-agent issues, monopoly provision, information asymmetry, and tragedy of the commons. Rather than presenting our...

In this paper, I study a principal-multiagent model in which the principal adopts relative performance evaluation (RPE) as the compensation scheme, and agents are connected in an information network. The ability of each agent is private information, but adjacent agents in the information network...

I conduct a laboratory experiment to analyze the influence of whistleblower protection on the cooperative behavior between a manager and an employee. Before taking part in a trust game with her employee, a manager has the opportunity to embezzle money at the expense of a third party. The...

Previous studies have shown that an oath can reduce lying at an individual level. Can oaths reduce lying in groups, a context where the prevalence of lying is typically higher? Results from a lab experiment reveal that the impact of an oath on lying in a group context depends on the incentive...