Search Results - subject:"Private Monitoring"

Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 3, pp. 311-340

Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public …. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent … sufficient to determine behavior). We show that, in games with general almost-public private monitoring, this is essentially the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005730970

Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 3, pp. 311-340

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702996

Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games

Yamamoto, Yuichi - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2013

underlying game are unknown. Specifically, we consider a new class of repeated games with private monitoring, where an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010822878

Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring

Sugaya, Takuo; Takahashi, Satoru - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 5, pp. 1891-1928

equilibrium behavior with respect to ex-ante small private-monitoring perturbations. We show that with full support of public …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043043

Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication

Laclau, M. - In: Economics Letters 120 (2013) 2, pp. 332-337

I consider repeated games with local monitoring: each player observes his neighbors’ moves only. Hence, monitoring is private and imperfect. Communication is private: each player can send different (costless) messages to different players. The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010678807