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  • Search: subject:"Probabilistic verification"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Probabilistic verification 3 evidence 3 matching 2 mechanism design 2 Agency theory 1 Asymmetric information 1 Asymmetrische Information 1 Matching 1 Mechanism design 1 Mechanismus-Design-Theorie 1 Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie 1 ordering tests 1
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Online availability
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Free 3 CC license 2
Type of publication
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Article 3
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Article in journal 2 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 2 Article 1
Language
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English 3
Author
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Silva, Francisco 2 Ball, Ian 1 Kattwinkel, Deniz 1 Pereyra, Juan 1 Pereyra, Juan Sebastián 1
Published in...
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Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory 2 Theoretical Economics 1
Source
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ECONIS (ZBW) 2 EconStor 1
Showing 1 - 3 of 3
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Probabilistic verification in mechanism design
Ball, Ian; Kattwinkel, Deniz - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 20 (2025) 4, pp. 1247-1284
We introduce a model of probabilistic verification in mechanism design. The principal elicits a message from the agent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015532988
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Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
Pereyra, Juan Sebastián; Silva, Francisco - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 2, pp. 793-836
Objects of different quality are to be allocated to agents. Agents can receive at most one object, and there are not enough high-quality objects for every agent. The value to the social planner from allocating objects to any given agent depends on that agent's private information. The social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536950
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Cover Image
Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
Pereyra, Juan; Silva, Francisco - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 18 (2023) 2, pp. 793-836
Objects of different quality are to be allocated to agents. Agents can receive at most one object, and there are not enough high-quality objects for every agent. The value to the social planner from allocating objects to any given agent depends on that agent's private information. The social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014325235
Saved in:
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