It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute … necessary to create an indicator measuring de jure as well as de facto independence of the prosecution agencies. The regressions … show that de facto independence of prosecution agencies robustly reduces corruption of officials. …

It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute … necessary to create an indicator measuring de jure as well as de facto independence of the prosecution agencies. The regressions … show that de facto independence of prosecution agencies robustly reduces corruption of officials. …

It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute … necessary to create an indicator measuring de jure as well as de facto independence of the prosecution agencies. The regressions … show that de facto independence of prosecution agencies robustly reduces corruption of officials. …

It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute … necessary to create an indicator measuring de jure as well as de facto independence of the prosecution agencies. The regressions … show that de facto independence of prosecution agencies robustly reduces corruption of officials. …