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Approval voting 1 Manipulation 1 Ranking sets of objects 1
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Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting
Endriss, Ulle - In: Theory and Decision 74 (2013) 3, pp. 335-355
Under approval voting, each voter can nominate as many candidates as she wishes and the election winners are those candidates that are nominated most often. A voter is said to have voted sincerely if she prefers all those candidates she nominated to all other candidates. As there can be a set of...
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