Traditional game theoretic analysis often proposes the application of backward induction and subgame-perfection as models of rational behaviour in games with perfect information. However, there are many situations in which such application leads to counterinitiative results, casting doubts on...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in <A HREF="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A%3A1003253925406">'De Economist'</A>, 1998, 146, 59-89.<P> Since the 1950's economists applied game theoretical concepts to a wide variety of economic problems. The Nash equilibrium concept has proven to be a powerful instrument in analyzing the outcome of economic...</p></a>

Since the 1950's economists applied game theoretical concepts to a wide variety of economic problems. The Nash equilibrium concept has proven to be a powerful instrument in analyzing the outcome of economic processes. Since the late 1980's economists also show a growing interest in the...

A single-component, two-dimensional lattice model of self-replicating entities (replicators) which exhibits a nonequilibrium first-order phase transition into a unique absorbing state is introduced and studied through extensive numerical simulations. The basic dynamic processes are...

The effect that exogenous mistakes, made by players choosing their strategies, have on the dynamic stability for the replicator dynamic is analyzed for both asymmetric and symmetric normal form games. Through these perturbed games, the dynamic solution concept of limit asymptotic stability is...

The analysis of the replicator dynamic in generic perfect information games yields the following results. In the long run, players play a Nash equilibrium provided that initially all strategies are present. There is at most one ``stable'' component (formally, an interior asymptotically stable...