By conducting a natural field experiment, we test whether a managerial policy of allowing employees to self-determine their wages is as successful as recently suggested by laboratory evidence. We find that this policy indeed enhances performance. However, our data is clearly at odds with the...

By conducting a natural field experiment, we test whether a managerial policy of allowing employees to self-determine their wages is as successful as recently suggested by laboratory evidence. We find that this policy indeed enhances performance. However, our data is clearly at odds with the...

Using an intergenerational trilateral laboratory gift-exchange game, we investigate how employers' own performance in a real effort task impacts on the wage setting behavior of younger and older employers. We find that the employers' own past performance strongly affects wage setting behavior,...

Using an intergenerational trilateral laboratory gift-exchange game, we investigate how employers' own performance in a real effort task impacts on the wage setting behavior of younger and older employers. We find that the employers' own past performance strongly affects wage setting behavior,...

Using an intergenerational trilateral laboratory gift-exchange game, we investigate how employers' own performance in a real effort task impacts on the wage setting behavior of younger and older employers. We find that the employers' own past performance strongly affects wage setting behavior,...

By conducting a natural field experiment, we test whether a managerial policy of allowing employees to self-determine their wages is as successful as recently suggested by laboratory evidence. We find that this policy indeed enhances performance. However, our data is clearly at odds with the...

Recent laboratory evidence suggests that employees who have the extraordinary right to self-determine their wages perform better. By conducting a natural field experiment, we aim to test whether this policy actually has the predicted positive effects in a real-labor market. Employees were hired...

This paper explores the effect of the possibility of third-party intervention on behavior in a variant of the Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) “Investment Gameâ€. A third party’s material payoff is not affected by the decisions made by the other participants, but this person may...

This paper explores the effect of the possibility of third-party intervention on behavior in a variant of the Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) “Investment Game”. A third-party’s material payoff is not affected by the decisions made by the other participants, but this person may choose to...