This paper discusses some connections among several robustness concepts of mechanisms in terms of agents' behaviors. Specifically, under certain conditions such as private values and ``rich'' interdependent values, we show that implementation in (one-round or iterative) undominated strategies, a...

We study the mechanism-design problem of guaranteeing desirable performances whenever agents are rational in the sense of not playing weakly dominated strategies. We first provide an upper bound for the best performance we can guarantee among all feasible mechanisms. We then prove the bound to...

Restricting attention to economic environments, we study implementation under perturbed better-response dynamics (BRD). A social choice function (SCF) is implementable in stochastically stable strategies of perturbed BRD whenever the only outcome supported by the stochastically stable strategies...

One of the most salient issues faced by platforms like newspapers and credit card issuers is that users are heterogeneous in the value they bring to other users or to the platform. We develop a model with multi-dimensional heterogeneity where a monopoly platform chooses (price or non-price)...

This essay is the introduction for a collection of papers by the two of us on "Robust Mechanism Design" to be published by World Scientific Publishing. The appendix of this essay lists the chapters of the book. The objective of this introductory essay is to provide the reader with an overview of...

Restricting attention to economic environments, we study implementation under perturbed better-response dynamics (BRD). A social choice function (SCF) is implementable in stochastically stable strategies of perturbed BRD whenever the only outcome supported by the stochastically stable strategies...

Building upon the classical concept of Holder continuity and the notion of "continuous implementation"introduced in Oury and Tercieux (2009), we define Hölder continuous implementation. We show that, under a richness assumption on the payo proles (associated with outcomes), the following full...

[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs and higher...