Search Results - subject:"Robust implementation"

Sjostrom, Tomas; Yamato, Takehiko; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi - In: Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) 3, pp. 203-229

functions and investigate the connections with dominant strategy implementation and robust implementation. We show that in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599388

The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2007

We consider the role of the common prior for robust implementation in an environment with interdependent values … sufficient conditions for robust implementation in common prior type spaces and contrast this with our earlier results without … the common prior. In the case of strategic complements the necessary and sufficient conditions for robust implementation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990820

Robust Virtual Implementation

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2007

In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs and higher order beliefs. We show that two payoff types are strategically distinguishable if and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005093936

Strategic Distinguishability and Robust Virtual Implementation

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2007

In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs and higher order beliefs. We show that two types are strategically distinguishable if and only if...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087388

Strategic Distinguishability with an Application to Robust Virtual Implementation

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2007

In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs and higher order beliefs. We show that two types are strategically distinguishable if and only if...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593300

Secure implementation

Sjostrom, Tomas; Yamato, Takehiko; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi - In: Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) 3

functions and investigate the connections with dominant strategy implementation and robust implementation. We show that in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005730971

Secure implementation

Saijō, Tatsuyoshi; Sjöström, Tomas; Yamato, Takehiko - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 2 (2007) 3, pp. 203-229

functions and investigate the connections with dominant strategy implementation and robust implementation. We show that in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702527

Stochastically stable implementation

Cabrales, Antonio; Serrano, Roberto - In: SERIEs 3 (2012) 1, pp. 59-72

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010846002

Locally robust implementation and its limits

Jehiel, Philippe; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz; Moldovanu, Benny - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 6, pp. 2439-2452

We study a notion of locally robust implementation that captures the idea that the planner may know agentsʼ beliefs … well, but not perfectly. Locally robust implementation is a weaker concept than ex-post implementation, but we show that no …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042947

Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms

Cabrales, Antonio; Serrano, Roberto - In: Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2011) 2, pp. 360-374

We study the classic implementation problem under the behavioral assumption that agents myopically adjust their actions in the direction of better-responses or best-responses. First, we show that a necessary condition for recurrent implementation in better-response dynamics (BRD) is a small...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577250