When setting budgets, managers may place constraints on how resources can be used in an effort to mitigate opportunistic behavior by subordinates. These restrictions can affect the ability of the subordinate to succeed in the budgeted task, but may also have an unintended spillover effect on the...

A versão em português deste texto está disponível em: "http://ssrn.com/abstract=2441607" http://ssrn.com/abstract=2441607 La versione italiana di questo documento è disponibile all'indirizzo: "http://ssrn.com/abstract=2607031" http://ssrn.com/abstract=2607031La versión en español de este...

The core emphasis of rules-based fiscal legislation at the subnational level in India is to achieve debt sustainability through a numerical ceiling on borrowing and the use of borrowed resources for public capital investment by phasing out revenue deficits. Using the Arellano Bond Panel...

This paper proposes an empirical framework that distinguishes voluntary from involuntary compliance with fiscal deficit targets on the basis of economic, institutional, and political factors. The framework is applied to Spain's Autonomous Communities (regions) over the period 2002-2015. Fiscal...

We evaluate the income elasticity of the aggregate budget share spent on a sub-group of commodities, in a competitive framework, by a continuum of agents having the same income, but heterogeneous behavior described by an "homothetic preferences scaling factor" having a bounded Pareto...

When setting budgets, managers may place constraints on how resources can be used in an effort to mitigate opportunistic behavior by subordinates. These restrictions can affect the ability of the subordinate to succeed in the budgeted task, but may also have an unintended spillover effect on the...

Bernheim and Whinston (1986) show that, in a common agency problem without budget constraints, the set of Nash equilibria with truthful strategies (TNE), the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria (CPNE), and the principal-optimal core of the underlying coalitional game exist and are all...