Search Results - subject:"STOCHASTIC GAMES"

Subgame-perfect equilibria in stochastic timing games

Riedel, Frank; Steg, Jan-Henrik - 2014

We introduce a notion of subgames for stochastic timing games and the related notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium in possibly mixed strategies. While a good notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium for continuous-time games is not available in general, we argue that our model is the appropriate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010406213

Continuous-time public good contribution under uncertainty

Ferrari, Giorgio; Riedel, Frank; Steg, Jan-Henrik - 2013

We study a continuous-time problem of optimal public good contribution under uncertainty for an economy with a finite number of agents. Each agent can allocate his wealth between private consumption and repeated but irreversible contributions to increase the stock of some public good. We study...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319969

Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Discounted Stochastic Games

Kitti, Mitri - 2013

stochastic games with finitely many states. It is shown that a policy is induced by an equilibrium strategy if and only if it can …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503041

Existence of the limit value of two person zero-sum discounted repeated games via comparison theorems

Vigeral, Guillaume; Sorin, Sylvain - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2013

We give new proofs of existence of the limit of the discounted values for two person zero-sum games in the following frameworks: incomplete information, absorbing, recursive. The idea of these new proofs is to use some comparison criteria.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706592

A Zero-Sum Stochastic Game with Compact Action Sets and no Asymptotic Value

Vigeral, Guillaume - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2013

We give an example of a zero-sum stochastic game with four states, compact action sets for each player, and continuous payoff and transition functions, such that the discounted value does not converge as the discount factor tends to 0, and the value of the n-stage game does not converge as n...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708475

Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up

Kranz, Sebastian - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

these corner cases. We establish a general existence result and a tractable characterization for stochastic games in which …We propose a unified framework to study relational contracting and hold-up problems in infinite horizon stochastic … games. We first illustrate that with respect to long run decisions, the common formulation of relational contracts as Pareto …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010607540