Search Results - subject:"Secure implementation"

An impossibility theorem for secure implementation in discrete public good economies

Nishizaki, Katsuhiko - In: Economics Bulletin 33 (2013) 1, pp. 300-308

This paper studies the possibility of secure implementation (Saijo, T., T. Sjostrom, and T. Yamato (2007) "Secure … implementation," Theoretical Economics 2, pp.203-229) in discrete public good economies with quasi-linear preferences. We find that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278664

Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets

Fujinaka, Yuji; Wakayama, Takuma - 2009

This paper considers the object allocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We study secure … implementation (Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007), that is, double implementation in dominant strategy and Nash equilibria. We prove …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332437

Secure implementation

Tatsuyoshi Saijo; Tomas Sjostrom; Takehiko Yamato - Osaka University; Rutgers University; Tokyo Institute … - 2007

, i.e., secure implementation. We characterize securely implementable social choice functions and investigate the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009455268

Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money

Fujinaka, Yuji; Wakayama, Takuma - 2007

This paper studies the application of the notion of secure implementation (Cason, Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2006 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332239

Secure implementation

Sjostrom, Tomas; Yamato, Takehiko; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi - In: Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) 3, pp. 203-229

equilibrium and in dominant strategies, i.e., secure implementation. We characterize securely implementable social choice …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599388

Secure implementation

Sjostrom, Tomas; Yamato, Takehiko; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi - In: Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) 3

equilibrium and in dominant strategies, i.e., secure implementation. We characterize securely implementable social choice …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005730971

Secure implementation

Saijō, Tatsuyoshi; Sjöström, Tomas; Yamato, Takehiko - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 2 (2007) 3, pp. 203-229

equilibrium and in dominant strategies, i.e., secure implementation. We characterize securely implementable social choice …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702527

Full-truthful implementation in Nash equilibria

Mizukami, Hideki; Wakayama, Takuma - 2006

equivalent to secure implementation (Saijo et al. (2005)). This gives us an alternative characterization of securely …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332282

Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-proof Mechanisms Really Work?

Cason, Timothy N.; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi; Sjostrom, Tomas; … - School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study - 2005

Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept used in social choice theory. Saijo et al. (2003) argue that this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash equilibria, including equilibria...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005163099