We study, theoretically and empirically, the effects of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated … show that social good production more than doubles in the low-incentive team, but only if self-selection is possible. Our …

We study, theoretically and empirically, the effects of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated … show that social good production more than doubles in the low-incentive team, but only if self-selection is possible. Our …

market. We design a novel version of the gift-exchange game to account for self-selection, and find that wages remain the …

We study, theoretically and empirically, the effects of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated … show that social good production more than doubles in the lowincentive team, but only if self-selection is possible. Our …

We study, theoretically and empirically, the effects of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated … show that social good production more than doubles in the low-incentive team, but only if self-selection is possible. Our …