solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game, and present conditions under which the semistrict … core of the game is nonempty. …

players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game. We formalize the notion of semistrict core stability, which is … semistrict core, dependent on conditions we impose on the solution concept. It turns out that a bounded power condition, which …

solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game, and present conditions under which the semistrict … core of the game is nonempty. …

players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game. We formalize the notion of semistrict core stability, which is … semistrict core, dependent on conditions we impose on the solution concept. It turns out that a bounded power condition, which …

solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game, and present conditions under which the semistrict … core of the game is nonempty. …

solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game, and present conditions under which the semistrict … core of the game is nonempty. …

) are sufficient conditions for core stability in hedonic games. We introduce the semistrict core as a stronger stability … structures. Moreover, for each game satisfying the common ranking property, the core and the semistrict core coincide. …

) are sufficient conditions for core stability in hedonic games. We introduce the semistrict core as a stronger stability … structures. Moreover, for each game satisfying the common ranking property, the core and the semistrict core coincide. …

) are sufficient conditions for core stability in hedonic games. We introduce the semistrict core as a stronger stability … structures. Moreover, for each game satisfying the common ranking property, the core and the semistrict core coincide. …