Search Results - subject:"Sender–receiver"

Ebert, Michael; Simons, Dirk; Stecher, Jack D. - In: The accounting review : a publication of the American … 92 (2017) 1, pp. 73-91

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011646246

Evasive lying in strategic communication

Khalmetski, Kiryl; Rockenbach, Bettina; Werner, Peter - In: Journal of public economics 156 (2017), pp. 59-72

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011824095

Truth, trust, and sanctions: On institutional selection in sender-receiver games

Peeters, Ronald; Vorsatz, Marc; Walzl, Markus - 2011

-telling and trust in sender-receiver games. We find that in an institution with sanctioning opportunities, receivers sanction …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294822

Decision-Making With Potentially Biased Advisors

Kupiec, Kevin - 2011

some of their private information, and by considering the sender-receiver game, the simplest Bayesian game with … communication, it is possible to examine this belief. Previous research has studied the sender-receiver game in detail in order to … not always true. In order to close the gap in research that currently exists, this paper examines the sender-receiver game …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009475479

Truth-telling and Trust in Sender-receiver Games with Intervention

Gurdal, Mehmet Y.; Ozdogan, Ayca; Saglam, Ismail - 2011

preferences. In this paper, we show that this phenomenon is more pronounced in sender-receiver games where a truthful regulator …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500188

Truth-telling and Trust in Sender-receiver Games with Intervention

Saglam, Ismail; Gurdal, Mehmet Y.; Ozdogan, Ayca - İktisat Bölümü, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi - 2011

preferences. In this paper, we show that this phenomenon is more pronounced in sender-receiver games where a truthful regulator …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009323072

Truth, trust, and sanctions: On institutional selection in sender-receiver games

Peeters, Ronald; Vorsatz, Marc; Walzl, Markus - Institut für Finanzwissenschaft, Fakultät für … - 2011

-telling and trust in sender-receiver games. We find that in an institution with sanctioning opportunities, receivers sanction …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009385916

Competition, preference uncertainty, and jamming : a strategic communication experiment

Minozzi, William; Woon, Jonathan - In: Games and economic behavior 96 (2016), pp. 97-114

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011742201

Nash Equilibrium and information transmission coding and decoding rules

Hernandez, Penelope; Salvador, Amparo Urbano; Vila, Jose E. - Estructura de Recerca Interdisciplinar Comportament … - 2010

The design of equilibrium protocols in sender-receiver games where communication is noisy occupies an important place …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008455644

Non-uniqueness of equilibria in one-shot games of strategic communication

Valsecchi, Irene - 2009

The paper shows that Perfect Bayesian equilibria need not be unique in the strategic communication game of Crawford and Sobel (1982). First, different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality, despite fixed prior beliefs. Hence, there can be different equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279630