Search Results - subject:"Sender–receiver"

Non-Uniqueness of Equilibria in One-Shot Games of Strategic Communication

Valsecchi, Irene - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

The paper shows that Perfect Bayesian equilibria need not be unique in the strategic communication game of Crawford and Sobel (1982). First, different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality, despite fixed prior beliefs. Hence, there can be different equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008032

Beliefs and truth-telling: A laboratory experiment

Peeters, Ronald; Vorsatz, Marc; Walzl, Markus - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 113 (2015) C, pp. 1-12

We conduct a laboratory experiment with a constant-sum sender–receiver game and a sequential game of matching pennies …-telling. While first-movers in matching pennies choose an action at random, senders in the sender–receiver game tell the truth more …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263922

Information transmission in nested sender–receiver games

Chen, Ying; Gordon, Sidartha - In: Economic Theory 58 (2015) 3, pp. 543-569

<Para ID="Par1">We introduce a “nestedness” relation for a general class of sender–receiver games and compare …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011240828

Beliefs and truth-telling : a laboratory experiment

Peeters, Ronald; Vorsatz, Marc; Walzl, Markus - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 113 (2015), pp. 1-12

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011401040

Information transmission in nested sender-receiver games

Chen, Ying; Gordon, Sidartha - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 58 (2015) 3, pp. 543-569

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374036

Truth-telling and trust in sender–receiver games with intervention: an experimental study

Gurdal, Mehmet; Ozdogan, Ayca; Saglam, Ismail - In: Review of Economic Design 18 (2014) 2, pp. 83-103

Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in sender–receiver games. We show that this phenomenon is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010994711

Communication and authority with a partially informed expert

Agastya, Murali; Bag, Parimal Kanti; Chakraborty, Indranil - In: The Rand journal of economics 45 (2014) 1, pp. 176-197

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010394401

Truth-telling and trust in sender-receiver games with intervention : an experimental study

Gurdal, Mehmet Y.; Ozdogan, Ayca; Sağlam, İsmail - In: Review of economic design : RED 18 (2014) 2, pp. 83-103

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365517

Nash codes for noisy channels

Hernández, Penélope; Stengel, Bernhard von - In: Operations research 62 (2014) 6, pp. 1221-1235

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010471871

Profit-seeking punishment corrupts norm obedience

Xiao, Erte - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 321-344

Punishment typically involves depriving violators of resources they own such as money or labor. These resources can become revenue for authorities and thus motivate profit-seeking punishment. In this paper, we design a novel experiment to provide direct evidence on the role punishment plays in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049700