Search Results - subject:"Separable preferences"

Non-separability and sectoral comovement in a sticky price model

Kim, Kwang Hwan; Katayama, Munechika - In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 37 (2013) 9, pp. 1715-1735

approach. We find that the non-separable preferences are supported by the data and our estimated model generates the sectoral …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010871002

The delayed effects of monetary shocks in a two-sector New Keynesian model

Katayama, Munechika; Kim, Kwang Hwan - In: Journal of Macroeconomics 38 (2013) PB, pp. 243-259

non-durable and durable spending in this setup. We find that nominal wage rigidity and non-separable preferences between …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719798

Non-separability and sectoral comovement in a sticky price model

Kim, Kwang Hwan; Katayama, Munechika - In: Journal of economic dynamics & control 37 (2013) 9, pp. 1715-1735

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009786087

The delayed effects of monetary shocks in a two-sector New Keynesian model

Katayama, Munechika; Kim, Kwang Hwan - In: Journal of macroeconomics 38 (2013) 2, pp. 243-259

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010372014

Multiplicatively Separable Preferences and Output Persistence

Vaona, Andrea - Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics - 2005

In the New-Neoclassical Synthesis literature it is customary to use additively separable preferences, very often not … not only support multiplicatively and not additively separable preferences, but highlight new problems for the New … campatible with long-run productivity growth and trend infation. The present paper shows that using multiplicatively separable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005509632

A Characterization of Plurality-Like Rules Based on Non-Manipulability, Restricted Efficiency, and Anonymity

Ju, Biung-Ghi - Department of Economics, University of Kansas - 2005

A society needs to decide which issues (laws, public projects, public facilities, etc.) in an agenda to accept. The decision can be any subset of the agenda but must reflect the preferences of its members, which are assumed to be ¡°separable weak orderings¡±. We characterize a family of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005115536

The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences

Chatterji, Shurojit; Roy, Souvik; Sen, Arunava - In: Journal of Mathematical Economics 48 (2012) 6, pp. 353-366

strategy-proof deterministic social choice functions for multi-dimensional models with separable preferences obtained in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010875288

Efficiency of competitive equilibria with hidden action : the role of separable preferences

PANACCIONE, Luca - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2004

result of constrained efficiency rests crucially on the assumption of separable preferences and on the structure of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008655

A Contribution to the Economic Theory of Fertility

Cordoba, Juan Carlos; Ripoll, Marla - Department of Economics, Iowa State University - 2011

The evidence strongly suggests a robust negative relationship between income and fertility, and a positive relationship between income and longevity. This is puzzling for standard dynamic models. For instance, altruistic models that use the most standard preferences in macro --time separable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009142473

Voting by Committees under Constraints

Salvador BARBER?; Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: … - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2001

We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572210