strategies. We identify a new condition, which we call set-monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for … rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonicity, which is the key condition for Nash … implementation and which also had been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Set-monotonicity …

strategies. We identify a new condition, which we call set-monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for … rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonicity, which is the key condition for Nash … implementation and which also had been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Set-monotonicity …

alternative to be the outcome of a pure Nash equilibrium. We show that the condition of weak set-monotonicity, a weakening of …

alternative to be the outcome of a pure Nash equilibrium. We show that the condition of weak set-monotonicity, a weakening of …

the outcome of a pure equilibrium. We show that set-monotonicity, a weakening of Maskinʼs monotonicity, is necessary for … mixed Nash implementation. With at least three players, set-monotonicity and no-veto power are sufficient. Important …