Search Results - subject:"Shapley–Shubik power index"

Size reduction reform in German Parliament: a game theoretic analysis of power indices in the Bundestag

Duman, Papatya; Haake, Claus-Jochen - 2024

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014492212

The Terms of Cooperation’s Stability. What is the Reason of Flow Between Coalitions?

Jasiński, Mikołaj - In: Collegium of Economic Analysis Annals (2013) 32, pp. 55-76

The following article presents an application of game-theoretical models, meant to describe and explain the conditions of stability of coalitions created within decision-making bodies. The basis of the presented approach is the concept of power indices, as well as subadditivity and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011010439

Fairness and Squareness: Fair Decision Making Rules in the EU Council?

Turnovec, František - Institut ekonomických studií, Univerzita Karlova v Praze - 2009

index, Shapley-Shubik power index, square root rule, simple voting game JEL: C71, D72, H77 Acknowledgements: This … cooperative game theory) introduced by Felsenthal, Machover and Zwicker (1998). Shapley-Shubik power index was declared to … against Shapley- Shubik power index, based on its interpretation as a P-power concept, are not sufficiently justified. Both …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005698687

Fairness and squareness: fair decision making rules in the eu council?

Turnovec, Frantisek - In: Operations Research and Decisions 4 (2009), pp. 110-124

In this paper we analyze the following problem: assuming that the distribution of voting weights in a simple voting committee is fair (whatever this means), how should we set up a voting rule to guarantee that the distribution of influence (relative voting power) is as close as possible to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008777189

Fairness and squareness: Fair decision making rules in the EU council?

Turnovec, František - 2009

The concept of fair representation of voters in a committee representing different voters' groups, such as national representations in union of states, is discussed. This concept, introduced into discussion about voting rights in the Council of European Union in 2004, was narrowed to proposal of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010322221

Duality of Power in the European Parliament

Turnovec, František - Institut ekonomických studií, Univerzita Karlova v Praze - 2008

Increasing number of studies is focusing attention to constitutional analysis of European Union institutions and distribution of intra-institutional and inter-institutional influence in the European Union decision making. Most of the studies are related to distribution of voting power in the EU...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005698717

Duality of power in the European parliament

Turnovec, František - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010322260

Social Indeterminacy

Kalai, Gil - Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University … - 2004

strong simple game G if the voting power of each individual, measured by the it Shapley-Shubik power index, is sufficiently …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005459364

Absenteeism, Substitutes, and Complements in Simple Games

Quint, Thomas; Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2003

-derive Myerson's (1977, 1980) ibalanced contributionsi property for the Shapley-Shubik power index. In fact, we derive a formula …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087387

Absenteeism, Substitutes, and Complements and the Banzhaf Index

Quint, Thomas - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2003

games, called the absentee index. Our analysis was based on the theory of the Shapley-Shubik power index (SSPI) for simple …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762592