Consider a group of agents located along a polluted river where every agent must pay a certain cost for cleaning up the polluted river. Following the model of Ni and Wang (2007), we propose the class of alpha-Local Responsibility Sharing methods, which generalizes the Local Responsibility...

Consider a group of agents located along a polluted river where every agent must pay a certain cost for cleaning up the polluted river. Following the model of Ni and Wang (2007), we propose the class of α-Local Responsibility Sharing methods, which generalizes the Local Responsibility Sharing...

We study coalition formation and the strategic timing of membership of an IEA for environmental issues in the Coalitional Bargaining Game (CBG) of Gomes 2005, Econometrica). For the general CBG, we derive the necessary and sufficient condition for immediate formation of the grand coalition. We...

This discussion paper led to a publication in <A href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10640-014-9862-0">Environmental and Resource Economics</A> (forthcoming).<P> We study coalition formation and the strategic timing of membership of an IEA for environmental issues in the Coalitional Bargaining Game (CBG) of Gomes 2005, Econometrica). For the general CBG, we...</p></a>