We consider a class of optimal liquidation problems where the agent's transactions create transient price impact driven by a Volterra-type propagator along with temporary price impact. We formulate these problems as minimization of a revenue-risk functionals, where the agent also exploits...

Priority structures are uncertain in real-life college admissions markets. This study investigates how information structures on priority affect resulting allocations. To do this, we focus on a class of real-life information structures that are represented as cutoff signals, which privately tell...

Individuals often select which university they will attend based on the institution's reputation. They do so to signal to employers their abilities, which may affect their hireability and wages. We study these signaling effects by exploiting a change in Ecuador's governmental university ranking...

The empirical literature on employer learning assumes that employers learn about unobserved ability differences across workers as they spend time in the labor market. This article describes testable implications that arise from this basic hypothesis and how they have been used to quantify the...

This paper exploits the 2003 mutual fund trading scandal to investigate firms’ seemingly myopic investment behavior following negative stock price shocks. Firms affected by the scandal are more likely to meet or marginally beat earnings targets by cutting research and development and other...

We propose a behavioral signaling framework to explain the positive announcement effects of stock splits. (Retail) investors view stock splits as good news and are loss averse. Thus, a stock split can boost investors’ expectations of the firm’s growth potential and its stock price, but may...

The difficulty of SME financing is a global problem. A government guarantee system could alleviate the asymmetric information between banks and SMEs, driving financial resources to them. A unique dataset from Zhejiang provincial guarantee group has been used in this article to verify the...

I study a multi-sender signaling game between an uninformed decision maker and two senders with common private information and conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that is tied to the size of the misrepresentation. The main results concern the amount of information...

How people attribute the others’ previous actions often influences their feeling of inequality and then their subsequent responses. In a bilateral ultimatum bargaining game with both inequality aversion and incomplete information, a greedy offer can be attributed to either the proposer’s...

In China's labor market, there is a phenomenon that enterprises choose whether to provide "social insurance and housing fund" to laborers autonomously. This paper use micro-data from two leading Internet recruitment platforms and empirically finds that in a labor market with double-side...